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Digital identity

The opportunity for government



Access
Partnership

Introduction

Governments around the world are increasingly implementing digital identity (digital ID) systems to improve social services and promote innovation. The COVID-19 pandemic reinforced this trend and emphasized just how important it is that everyone be able to prove their identity online. This report aims to explore the strategic decisions underpinning successful implementations of digital ID systems. It draws practical insights for public sector leaders looking to steer their countries towards a well-designed and successful digital ID system, examining the successes and pitfalls others have encountered. In particular, the implementation of foundational digital ID, biometric-based authentication, and cloud-based infrastructure is emerging as best practice to help government navigate these challenges and maximize positive impact for their citizens.

The identity challenge

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is clear: Everyone has the right to be recognized as a person before the law (United Nations General Assembly 1948; 1966). On top of this, everyday activities hinge on people being able to prove their identities. The United Nations defines legal identity as the basic characteristics (such as name, age, gender, date, and place of birth) conferred or recognized by a legally recognized authority. This is often done through registration and issuance of a certificate such as enrollment in a registry of births or other instruments of the civil registration system (United Nations Legal Identity Agenda).

It comes as no surprise then that the right to identity is featured in the United Nation's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Further to this, increasing the number of legally identified people is part of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In order to promote peaceful and inclusive societies, SDG 16.9 established the objective of providing legal identity for all by 2030.

Although SDGs have catalyzed multi-stakeholder engagement since their approval in 2015, we are still far from achieving legal identification for all. Indeed, over half the world population may lack the ability to prove their identities online. The only indicator currently associated with SDG 16.9 refers to the proportion of children under five years whose births have been registered with a civil authority. This does not capture the full scope of the challenge. The World Bank's Identification for Development (ID4D) initiative attempts to go further and estimate the total number of individuals without a legal identity. The result is far from good. According to the most recent ID4D estimates, by 2018, one billion people globally did not have official proof of identity.

1: To address this methodological challenge, ID4D combined two different measurement strategies: (1) The Global ID4D Dataset, which is based on official figures from national ID authorities, voter registries, and UNICEF birth registration data; (2) Representative surveys from 99 countries, collected in partnership with the World Bank's Global Findex team. ID4D warns that neither of these is a perfect measure at the country level, but they provide a reasonable estimate regarding the scale of the global identity gap.

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Digital ID systems

Public digital identity (ID) systems, underpinning the provision of legal identity to the population, can address both challenges, granting legal identities to use online.

A digital ID system can be defined as a personal identification system that uses digital technology to capture personal data defining a person's identity as well as providing for storage, management, and authentication protocols, which allow for a party receiving the digital ID to validate it during specific uses (World Bank, 2019a). By creating a unique digital ID, verifying that it corresponds to each person and their legal identity, digital ID systems guarantee these identities can be easily authenticated through digital channels to conduct specific transactions. Digital ID systems lead to multiple direct and indirect benefits. These include expanding public and private services to more people, increasing public services' transparency, efficiency, and agility, and boosting economic growth. Still, implementing digital ID also poses challenges related to data privacy and trust, security, and inclusion. This report argues that those challenges can and must be overcome through effective implementation.

Implementation requires confronting the multiple alternative models for digital ID systems, exploring different purposes, design choices, and operational characteristics that need to be considered when establishing a program's strategic direction. With no one-size-fits-all solution, different countries and public entities should be mindful of implementation contexts and desired outcomes when deciding on how to structure their digital ID systems.

This report further seeks to explore what defines a well-designed digital ID system and explores critical factors underlying its successful implementation. In particular, certain mindsets around data privacy and security must be confronted and debunked in order to provide a clear picture of how cloud-based digital ID systems can provide the speed, scale, and security needed for success. Drawing from the experiences of several countries, there are a number of high-level processes governments should strategically follow to establish and implement a well-designed system. Learn about some of the governance, technical, and policy considerations that support these processes.

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Chapter 1: The opportunity of digital identity

Digital ID systems enable a government to do much more than simply issue identification documents. The benefits of digital ID systems go beyond enhancing legal compliance; they help make public and private services accessible to more people, act as a key innovation enabler, lead to higher transparency, and boost economic growth.

If implementation of digital ID was already important, it has become essential in the wake of COVID-19, which has sped up digital transformation worldwide. Many governments turned to digital channels to financially support households, organize COVID-19 testing programs, roll out vaccination plans, hold phone and video medical consultations, and transition education to online digital channels. These government services required people to digitally prove their identities in some form or another.

It comes as no surprise, then, that an increasing number of governments aim to start or expand their digital ID systems. In line with this trend, the Declaration of G20 digital ministers in August 2021 included for the first time 'inclusive digital identity' as a central component in economic recovery, development, and government transformation (G20 2021).

In collaboration with the OECD, the G20 has set up a mechanism for sharing digital identity best practice between G20 countries, acknowledging both the benefits these solutions bring, but also the challenges involved. In particular, digital ID systems present implementation challenges that are hard to solve under traditional paradigms, including issues such as privacy and trust, digital security, and inclusion.

Many practical implementation decisions associated with digital ID systems cannot be properly considered without exploring and understanding these benefits and challenges.


Benefit 1: Accessibility and Inclusion


Without a recognized form of identification, it is difficult to enroll in school, access social services, pass through border crossings, claim pensions and social welfare payments, open a bank account, obtain a mobile phone, present credentials for jobs and occupations, access healthcare services, vote in elections, or register businesses (World Bank, 2019b).

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Figure 2: Systems that depend on personal identification





Despite placing these limitations on the system, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of Aadhaar in 2018 and affirmed that the system could continue to be used by the state, although it limited the use of biometric authentication by private companies. The court recognized that “the Aadhaar Act is a beneficial legislation which is aimed at empowering millions of people.” However, the ruling also stated that “data protection and data safety” must be “ensured to avoid even the remote possibility of data profiling or data leakage.” According to industry experts involved in developing Aadhaar, limiting the use of biometric authentication by private companies has curtailed the full potential of the Aadhaar system.

Implementation challenge 2: Security and misuse

Poor design of a digital ID system can place personal data at risk and foster the growth of cyberthreats. An effective framework for a digital ID system must be supported by an equally strong technical architecture and information security framework to safeguard data, as databases containing large amounts of personal information, including biometrics, are attractive targets for criminals. An additional challenge lies in the secure communication of data during authentication processes, especially when such systems are used for financial transactions.

As is true with privacy, ensuring trust in the security of digital ID systems is a challenge many countries face which can stretch resources and challenge the capabilities of even sophisticated countries without leveraging the expertise of more sophisticated technology partners such as with cloud technology. In October 2017, a security flaw was identified in the cryptographic keys associated with approximately 750,000 Estonian eID cards, which potentially allowed users’ private keys to be inferred from public keys. The flaw left eID vulnerable to identity theft, with the country’s prime minister quickly announcing that affected cards would be disabled until the problem was solved (e-Estonia, 2018). Similar design flaws can also open gaps which can be exploited for fraud and misuse. For example, Australia’s myGovID, an app launched in 2019 aimed to allow users to establish their identity with Australian Government services. Original customer reviews quickly drew attention to poor security measures, such as how easily a person with fraudulent intent could register accounts using readily and commonly available information. Even though the system has been strengthened, security researchers have pointed to enduring flaws in the login process that could give unlawful access to personal accounts (Saarinen, 2020). The digital services overhaul of the MyGov ecosystem is set to cost USD 200 million. In order for digital identities to properly extend to digital health records, an additional USD 300 million will also be invested (Crowe, 2021).

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Implementation challenge 3: Inclusion

As argued before, digital ID systems can allow easier access to all services requiring proof of identity and foster inclusion. However, those without sufficient access to technology, especially the Internet, or with the physical capability or skills to make use of them, can be left outside the system.

Digital ID systems are often based on biometrics. Even though it's a potentially powerful tool to quickly and easily extend access to many without special cards or devices, if poorly executed it can lead to the opposite effect and, in some cases, exclude certain segments of the population. Biometric identifiers such as fingerprints cannot always be captured or checked for older people, people with disabilities, or those who do intensive manual work. Undergoing an iris scan can be nearly impossible for people with involuntary movements (Privacy International, 2021). In India, for instance, there have been demands for Aadhaar enrolment centers to be accessible to the elderly and wheelchair users (Krishna 2018). Evidence indicates that, in certain cases, compulsory biometrics led to exclusion of some from public food distribution programs (Muralidharan, Niehaus, and Sukhtankar, 2020). Therefore, while rolling out a digital ID program, it is equally important to enable mechanisms that allow enrolment for exceptional cases. For example, Aadhaar has biometric exception provisions in its enrolment software to enable enrolment of residents with poor or no biometric. Similarly, when a digital ID system is being introduced in public service delivery, one should focus on overall process re-engineering and ensure mechanisms to extend service delivery to people who may not have either a digital ID or are unable to verify their identity digitally.

A digital ID system can also exclude those with fewer skills in using technology. When public and private services undergo a process of digital transformation, population subgroups less comfortable with digital channels could be unintentionally left behind. If this is left unaddressed, it can have dire effects on the inclusion of the elderly, and it is also particularly damaging for gender equality; according to UNESCO and the EQUALS Coalition, women and girls are 25 percent less likely than men to know how to leverage digital technology for basic purposes (UNESCO and EQUALS Skills Coalition, 2019).

Digital ID challenges in Uganda

Uganda's digital ID system faced inclusion challenges in its initial biometric registration phase. Persons with disabilities were turned away from registration centers, as there were no alternatives to providing fingerprints. The severity of the problem was increased in many cases by long distances between registration centers and where many people lived, as well as the lack of application forms provided in local languages (Iyer, 2021).

A system that was non-inclusive led to direct exclusion in service delivery for groups that were already marginalized. Initially, the Ministry of Health stated that a registered identity would be required for COVID-19 vaccination, a requirement that was later withdrawn. Another example is older people, who were excluded from welfare payments for being unaware of their date of birth or unable to prove it when registering for digital IDs.

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Chapter 2: Digital ID structures

ID systems have historically been used by governments to provide individuals with official proof of identity. These systems collect identity attributes—such as name, address, date-of-birth, and fingerprints—and then validate them to establish an individual's identity. This validation is demonstrated through credentials like ID cards or unique identification numbers, which individuals can use as proof of identity when interacting with relying parties such as government agencies, financial institutions, or employers (World Bank 2019a).

As shown in the previous chapter, countries are increasingly deploying digital ID systems, which leverage digital technology throughout the identity lifecycle to increase access to and inclusion in identity-based services; improve the design, operation, and transparency of government services; and enable previously untapped economic growth.

Digital ID systems are being used strategically to either modernize existing paper-based systems or establish brand new identity systems; they are particularly being leveraged by countries that do not have any established or reliable ID systems to leapfrog traditional models. These systems enable digital verification of their identity, ensuring that their digital identity corresponds to their actual identity and authentication—matching of their unique identifier—for a wide range of in-person, online, and remote transactions (World Bank ID4D Event 2021).

A successful digital ID system must have a strategic direction developed by governments in tandem with relevant public and private stakeholders. This common vision must guide decisions regarding the structure and implementation of a digital ID system and includes key decisions such as its purpose, use cases, and design, which are discussed in more detail below. Decisions on these aspects are strategic and vital to ensure that the design of a digital ID system is contextually and situationally appropriate.

Purpose of identity systems

All identity systems have either a foundational or functional purpose (GSMA 2018). Foundational systems are established and operated by governments to provide identity to the general population as a general purpose public good available and accessible to all, which is then verified through credentials such as national IDs. These foundational identity credentials, the creation and permissible use of which is usually provided for under law, are used in a wide variety of government and commercial transactions. Conversely, functional systems can be established and operated by either governments or private institutions to provide identity to a subset of a population for delivery of specific services (World Bank 2019a).

A single person may have a wide variety of functional IDs for different use cases such as confirming eligibility to drive a car or provide proof of insurance. Even though these may in some cases be leveraged as a public good by other parties for authentication purposes not originally envisioned, they are generally linked legally or operationally to a particular use case and may not serve for general purpose identification in all circumstances. Foundational and functional systems enable governments to pursue different use cases and serve different parts of the population, as well as utilize different operational practices and eligibility requirements (GSMA 2018; World Bank 2019a)

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Figure 3: Foundational Systems





Figure 4: Functional Systems



Peru's RENIEC sets the standard for foundational systems

The National Registry of Identification and Civil Status (RENIEC) is an autonomous constitutional body that maintains a centralized civil registry of all Peruvian citizens and distributes the National Identity Document (DNI), which is the only personal identity card recognized by the government. The card is used for civil, commercial, administrative, and judicial purposes such as voting, accessing eGovernment services, and engaging with private services such as banking and healthcare.

These IDs were traditionally paper-based. However, this existing national system is now serving as the base for physical cards with cryptographic chips (DNI-e) that provide electronic signature, smart card, and biometric authentication functionality (Reuben and Palacios 2018).


United States' state-issued driver licenses steer broad use of functional systems

Individual US states issue driver licenses that are used to verify an individual's eligibility to drive a car. These IDs, which are paper-based but slowly transitioning towards digital versions, are distributed to individuals once they pass requirements such as driving tests. They include facial images as well as biometric (i.e., height) and demographic (i.e., age) data.

Although the primary purpose of these IDs is to regulate the use of cars, they are also used for general identity verification; for example, Americans use driver licenses to prove their identity when traveling domestically and conduct age verification when making age-restricted purchases. The use of functional IDs as de facto proof of identity for uses beyond their intended scope is common in countries that lack foundational ID systems (World Bank 2019a).

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Foundational and functional ID systems collectively make up a country or region's larger identity ecosystem, where different systems can function either separately or together in a single jurisdiction for a variety of use cases. For example, Peru's DNI or DNI-e provide citizens with official proof of identity that can be used in all scenarios where identity verification and authentication are required; the country's government then utilizes this DNI to provide complementary functional IDs such as driver licenses to provide niche or add-on services that are not applicable to an entire population. In other countries, one or a set of functional IDs—such as a driver license, birth registry, or tax number—may be widely accepted throughout the identity ecosystem in the absence of a single foundational ID.

Therefore, a first strategic choice lies in whether a foundational or functional ID system is being pursued. Ultimately, a foundational system guarantees that a government is issuing a legal identity that can serve as a strong basis for additional public or private services

The Netherlands establishes a strategic vision for foundational digital identity infrastructure

In early 2021, the Dutch State Secretary for the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Raymond Knops, published his vision for the government to facilitate a streamlined and reliable national digital identity infrastructure for use by both citizens and organizations. The country currently has two different voluntary national digital identity systems: DigiD (public digital identity for citizens to interact with the government) and eHerkenning (public-private network of organizations to provide common authentication services).

Although the vision does not establish an implementation timeline, it states that all Dutch citizens will be assigned a unique digital foundational identity (DFI) containing verified identity data. The DFI will be used to create various functional IDs such as passports and driver licenses, as well as facilitate citizen interactions with public and private organizations both in the Netherlands and across the European Union. The strategic vision of the DFI is to speed up innovation, reduce privacy and security risks, give individuals sovereignty over their personal data, and provide freedom in choosing digital identity market solutions

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The rise of advanced biometrics

As countries weigh different design elements, one increasingly common choice is the use of biometrics for identity authentication. Use of these parameters, including fingerprints, iris scans, or facial geometry, carries several benefits.

1. They are intrinsic to individuals and unique, which, though always important, is especially so in countries with large populations.
2. They provide multiple alternative attributes, which is important to include individuals that may not have specific types of biometric attributes (i.e., fingerprints, irises, facial imprints).
3. They are lower cost and are easily integrated into daily life, especially with increasing mobile penetration, which is important to increase the feasibility and usage of a digital ID system.
4. They do not require individuals to use or carry specific devices, credentials, or tokens that could be lost, which is especially important in countries with less wealthy or more transient populations.
5. They do not require governments to deploy or maintain specific and dedicated hardware systems, which is important to increase convenience and longevity of digital ID systems and avoid vendor lock-in.

However, the use of biometrics may have drawbacks. Biometric data has heightened privacy risks due to its sensitive nature and, even though more secure than some identity technologies, stored biometric data may need additional cybersecurity guardrails. Additionally, use of special equipment may be required to gather or measure some biometric attributes, which can create logistical and inclusion challenges for delivering services to all segments of a population such as those in rural areas or with disabilities.

Furthermore, some communities may distrust biometric data capture due to perceived potential for surveillance or social or cultural stigmas. Like other design choices, governments should evaluate all attributes for identity authentication (including biometrics) and choose one that best matches their systems' purpose and cultural and social context.

As countries confront these individual design and technical choices, they can also evaluate them on a spectrum from instrumental to infrastructural approaches. Instrumental approaches are highly use case driven and reliant on unique standards or proprietary technology, whereas infrastructural ones are compatible with multiple use cases and leverage common standards and open-source technology (USAID 2017).

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


Instrumental approaches

- Purpose limited to a single identity use case or initiative
- Design, implementation, and phase-out driven by project time frame
- Dependent on custom software, hardware, and data standards

Infrastructural approaches

- Built with long-term objective
- Utilize open-source platforms and open standards
- Can repurpose for other use cases with minimal additional resources
- Designed and implemented with local stakeholders



Foundational and functional systems can incorporate elements of both instrumental and infrastructural approaches. However, approaches that fall along the infrastructural side of the spectrum tend to contribute more to countries seeking to create a cohesive and sustainable ID systems, whereas instrumental approaches must be put into the proper context, and can be inefficient, and ignore social, political, and economic aspects that are essential for system success (USAID 2017).

Instrumental approaches to digital ID systems can create challenges such as government agencies with proprietary siloed systems and the lack of a common trust framework across public and private identity stakeholders within the larger identity ecosystem (World Bank ID4D Event 2021). These challenges lead to larger scale waste and significant opportunity cost.

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Pitfalls to avoid when designing tech-drive ID systems

Exclusion of vulnerable communities such as rural, low income, marginalized, or disabled populations that may not have access to costly infrastructure or have lower capacity to engage with high-tech systems

Vendor lock-in and dependency that can reduce flexibility of a system to grow, prevent system re-use and evolution, and create greater costs to switch between vendors or proprietary technologies

Frequent and necessary system maintenance and upgrades to keep the system functional and secure

Fragmentation of ID systems in the same identity ecosystem due to potential technology or standards incompatibility

Governments should deploy digital ID systems that are not dependent on specific types of technology, modified to fit local conditions and contexts, and comply with interoperable practices and open standards for identity. These conditions are necessary to create dynamic and cohesive ID systems that can respond to rapidly evolving technologies, as well as prevent information fragmentation between different ID systems within identity environments.

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Operation of digital identity ecosystems

As countries implement new digital ID systems and digitize legacy paper ones, the identity ecosystem they operate within becomes more complex. Digital ID systems incorporate a wider range of actors with more diverse responsibilities, interests, and priorities than traditional paper-based ones (World Bank 2016).

This complexity has created new models that countries, regions, and private entities utilize to establish, operate, and manage digital ID systems. Several considerations may impact the implementation approach chosen, such as systems and actors already present in the existing ID ecosystem and the needs of specific stakeholder in the implementing country, region, or entity. It is also possible to implement hybrid models that incorporate elements of two or more models (McKinsey Global Institute 2019).

Centralized Ecosystem Model	
What is it?	One public entity provides a centralized government-driven digital ID system (World Bank 2016), where it operates and manages a central repository of individuals' identities. The public entity acts as an identity provider by authenticating individuals' identities and providing attributes to relying parties.
How is it best used?	The system provides a single source of truth for a complete and standardized view of individuals' identities, as well as streamlining access to critical online government services.
What is the role of the public sector?	This model is government-driven, where the public sector acts as both the regulator of the identity ecosystem as well as the identity provider by establishing a centralized national repository.
What is the role of the private sector?	This model does not carve out a large role for the private sector in the collection, verification, or authentication of identity. However, companies may support the technical implementation or deployment of the centralized identity repository and system (i.e., provisioning of software or hardware).
What are its advantages?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provides a legal identity • Streamlines service delivery • Leverages government presence throughout territory • Leverages existing government initiatives • Enables direct government control over whole system • Creates consistent ID services and experiences
What are its disadvantages?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • May not fully leverage third parties' (i.e., financial institutions) experience in managing digital identity • Requires strong buy-in from the government agency ecosystem • Concentrates risks and liabilities, creating a single point of failure
Where has it been used?	Aadhaar (India), NADRA (Pakistan), NIDA (Rwanda), PhilID (Philippines), RENAPER (Argentina), RENIEC (Peru)

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Future structures of digital ID systems

Even as countries, regions, and private entities are investing in and building out digital ID systems, technology is evolving at a rapid pace, changing digital ID systems' design and implementation. Most importantly, technology is enabling new ways to use an individual's information and behavior to establish trust in their identity. For example, advanced biometrics are creating stronger verification and authentication methods and distributed ledger technology is strengthening the protection and integrity of information.

Additionally, evolving concepts of digital identity are presenting new ways for identity to be collected and validated. For example, the European Union's Electronic Identification and Trust Services (eIDAS) Regulation promotes cross-border ID systems that are provided through supranational and regional organizations. These advancements and the resultant digital ID frameworks will continue to disrupt traditional ID systems and models.

Figure 7: Future structures of digital ID systems



Advanced Biometrics

Physical traits as identity attributes will increase as identification kits become more accessible and technologies enable collection and verification of niche biometrics such as voice. This data could identify those currently excluded or undeserved by existing systems



Self-Sovereign Identity

Individuals will own their identities as distributed ledger technologies become mainstream and countries strengthen foundational systems for identity verification. This type of model places individuals in control of identity transactions.



Supranational Systems

As movement across border continues to increase, it will be valuable to have a digital ID system that is globally recognized and based on common standards. This type of system could increase trade and promote safe migration.

As new technologies develop and the number of digital ID systems around the world continues to expand, best practices continue to evolve. To meet the needs of the moment, governments need to critically examine these so that they can move with the speed necessary to leverage the benefits of digital ID systems. Drawing from how some jurisdictions have successfully overcome challenges and how others became cautionary tales, the next chapter will explore how some of these lessons learned should shift mindsets to speed adoption of the most successful cloud-based approaches.

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Chapter 3: Designing an effective digital ID system

When making the decisions needed to set up a digital ID system, countries start with an array of elements and capabilities already in place, and they may seek to emphasize different goals and use cases of digital ID more than others. Nonetheless, successful strategies focus on making the choices that best enable a new digital ID system to:

- Be capable of uniquely identifying individuals and ensuring that only an individual can create and control their identity
- Provide reliable authentication robust enough for the intended purposes of the public sector as well as for the private sector
- Ensure inclusion of all strata of society, especially underprivileged or marginalized groups
- Be adequately secured and trustable to ensure confidence in the privacy of any information it contains
- Provide individuals with the information and choice they need to feel empowered
- Be nimble, scalable, adaptable, and future-proofed to adopt to technological advancement and new use cases beyond what was originally envisioned


There is no single model of the right digital ID system that will be appropriate to every context to achieve these ends. But there are many common challenges for governments and the stakes are high. First, the technical architecture of the system must be suitable. Whatever the deployment model, implementing digital ID requires significant infrastructure which must be appropriate in scale to the system and population served, both at launch and for anticipated future uses. It must also be designed to operate in a manner consistent with system needs, including managing large and fluctuating numbers of incoming authentication requests.

Second, significant efforts must go into protecting data. Personal data that is processed by the system must be appropriately governed with law, regulation, and policy as well as protected with technical and organizational measures in order to be compliant with the law and engender trust. In the face of constantly evolving security threats and technological capabilities, this is no easy task for any organization, including governments.

Third, the project must be effectively managed throughout its lifecycle. As with any complex government IT-enabled project, building and managing this infrastructure is complex, and opens many opportunities for poor design decisions, implementation problems, and operational errors to add unforeseen difficulty and expense. These risks only become greater the longer a system has been in place, as technology ages and becomes out of step with the larger technology ecosystem, new vulnerabilities are found or created, and use cases and user expectations evolve. When serving the population at large, it may only take a few problems to seriously undermine public confidence.

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Building for the future: Singapore's National Digital Identity (NDI)

Since 2003, Singapore has had an authentication system to access online government services, SingPass. In order to expand the reach and impact of the system and make it mobile, the government launched its National Digital Identity program in 2017 as part of the larger Smart Nation initiative. The new foundation of SingPass, NDI became operational in 2020, enabling new mobile identity capabilities.

NDI provides a common platform for government services as well as secure transactions with the private sector. It was designed from the ground up to be in the cloud, using a multi-cloud architecture for maximum resilience. This enabled the construction of a more flexible and scalable system that could serve as the basis of many public and private services not specifically planned at the inception. The government of Singapore created a developer platform and sandbox environment that enables external partners to build and integrate e-services with NDI in new ways.

This has allowed the creation of a set of APIs open to government and the private sector such as MyInfo, Login, Verify, Authorize, Sign, and Face. MyInfo, for example, is a digital vault of personal information that individuals can choose to disclose to government and private entities for services such as opening a bank account or accessing financial services (Smart Nation Singapore 2021; Computer Weekly 2018). Crucially, this flexible system facilitated rapid deployment of new e-services during the COVID-19 pandemic. Various new services have been built on top of NDI, including the national contract tracing app TraceTogether, the SafeEntry QR code-based entry management, and the system of health passports HealthCert, which allow seamless integration from issuance of a certificate by a vaccination clinic through generation of a QR code to verify vaccination status when needed (Singapore Government Developer Portal 2021).

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Myths and mindsets hamper effective digital ID

The design decisions of digital ID systems are critical and strategic in their ability to ensure that a country may have access to benefits quickly and more efficiently. Unfortunately, certain common misconceptions around digital identity—particularly when implemented using cloud computing—can lead to decisions which frustrate strategic goals. Misconceived ideas lead countries to favor approaches that result in higher expense and less flexible and robust systems. Policy makers should challenge these ideas and keep an open mind regarding the technical decisions underpinning successful systems.

Myth 1: Digital ID systems should require localization for security reasons

Because of the pivotal role they can play in enabling transactions between individuals, the government, and the private sector, as well as privacy concerns to safeguard personal data, governments rightly keep a strong focus on ensuring that digital ID systems are well secured. However, policymakers often see the best way to pursue this to mean keeping data tightly localized in one or a small number of systems, whether controlled by the government or a private contractor. Direct control over the data and its storage location is frequently perceived as a critical factor. This results in conditions on where private sector actors keep data, called data residency, when they provide a public digital ID system.

The reality is that location is no guarantee of security, and this approach hampers the ability to grow and develop a digital ID system to its fullest. In fact, data residency rules are counterproductive to ensuring that data is kept securely. Storage in a single location, especially when managed on premises, may provide a single point of failure as well as an enticing target for malicious actors. Should they be successful—for example, by finding a piece of unpatched software or configuration error—any breaches may then inflict maximum harm. Even though providing the appearance of control through proximity or physical access, this approach in fact leaves data more vulnerable. Ensuring true security depends on multiple factors that are agnostic regarding location, including encryption protocols, system configuration, software patching protocols, physical security measures, and access management.

Localization also entails added expense. Most benefits of digital identity derive from systems that are deployed as widely as possible. This means serving all of the population and enabling sufficient flexibility for public and private actors to develop new capabilities on top of the platform that digital identity provides. Matching the scale and variability of demand this entails requires a robust and elastic system that is simply not possible or too expensive for most government entities to build and run efficiently. A cloud-based architecture, including leveraging the capabilities of hyperscale cloud providers, would allow deployment of these systems at scale.

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Hyperscale cloud providers can, in fact, be safer than local infrastructure. Large commercial providers can leverage considerable resources and global expertise in order to implement and maintain the highest quality protections available, such as:

- Advanced physical safeguards and protocols to control access to hardware
- High quality encryption
- Real-time monitoring for security incidents
- Detailed audit logs
- Hardware-level encryption
- Highly verified supply chains, better guarding against the introduction of unknown vulnerabilities

Hyperscale cloud providers also offer advantages in terms of availability and resilience that on-premises solutions lack. When stored across different segregated geographic regions and/or with duplicate backups, cloud providers can provide a greater level of certainty and resilience to disruption than a single data center can—whatever its location.

Bound by customer contracts and strongly incentivized to maintain a reputation for reliability, providers are highly skilled at implementing security, including upgrading technologies, and implementing updates to patch newly discovered vulnerabilities. Ultimately, these security capabilities, which large professional providers are best situated to provide, are the critical factors that can ensure a trusted and secure digital ID system, not location.

Myth 2: Digital ID systems lead to privacy risks

Digital ID systems can play an important part of individuals' lives, from accessing critical services to conducting sensitive transactions. As consumers become more aware of online threats and breaches of their personal data, a digital ID system can look like another source of vulnerability. Especially in countries with a history of controversy over surveillance. And even in those countries where government access to citizen information is regarded as the norm, they can also look like an opportunity for authorities to access personal data in a manner that individuals may not be comfortable with. These concerns may be especially acute when data is stored in the cloud. The idea of data being held by a private party or stored in another jurisdiction subject to different laws can raise concerns.

The reality is that physical systems and on-premises storage of data are in practice less secure and private, whereas digital and cloud-based systems—especially when managed by professional cloud service providers, many of which are internationally certified to recognized privacy benchmarks—can offer important privacy-enhancing capabilities.

In practice, governments managing digital ID systems have less access to data than may be sometimes feared. Even in highly centralized systems, detailed data on individuals is not necessarily what is concentrated at the center of the system. Only a minimal amount of data is required to perform the core authentication function, such as basic identifiers and biometric templates. Transaction information or profiles of the individual are not required and can be discarded or held at the point of the individual interaction.



Policymakers should keep a full view of the possible benefits of all approaches, not just potential risks. Myths, including around cloud computing, can lead them to pursue approaches that provide the appearance of prudence and control at the expense of inferior protections, higher costs, and less robust capabilities. On the contrary, implementation of a digital ID system through cloud computing helps practitioners focus on and develop the best methods to overcome the most relevant challenges, namely how to:

- Enable future system growth, expansion, and innovation using digital ID as a base
- Minimize the data collected and utilized in order to build trust
- Design effective safeguards to keep sensitive data protected, not limited to location

Cloud emerges as a clear best practice and a powerful advantage for any national digital ID system. However, the decision to use cloud is just one component of effective design and implementation. What are the other key considerations to ensure an effective digital ID system? The following chapter will develop this line of inquiry further, to examine some additional best practices which enable successful implementation of digital ID systems from key design considerations to steps that ensure smooth roll out and wide adoption.

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Chapter 4: Lessons learned and best practices

Whether building a system from scratch or updating and expanding existing parts of the identity ecosystem, implementing a digital ID system is complex. Achieving a successful digital ID system which delivers benefits for the population is about much more than writing code and application software. Rather than applying a single technology template, it should be thought of more as a process to re-engineer systems in pursuit of social goals, with many steps between inception and a functioning system.

To carry an initiative forward, countries need not just technical features for success, but the right process and mindset to ensure a smooth roll out that provides advantages for all stakeholders.



1. Define goals and vision

From the start, those developing a digital ID system should have a very clear mission and vision. A clear vision of the path a country is setting out on and the desired end goals makes it easier to plan the way forward and navigate complications as they arise. This vision should align across core stakeholders. For example, a government agency that fully understands and supports from the beginning that a new foundational system will replace their existing functional system is less likely to create challenges mid-way through a project when they come to understand its full implications for how they manage public services.

Effective digital ID systems put people at the center, and design must start with people. Individual citizens understand the ground realities of public services requiring identity authentication and can help define goals that will provide the greatest good. Actively seeking and centering their views in conversations around digital ID, and system design can focus planning in the most productive areas as well as dispel concerns early—for example, around privacy, security, and data use. As part of coalescing a cohesive and achievable vision, consultation with parties directly involved in managing and deploying uses cases is crucial—especially public and private sector entities who may implement major use cases as well as the private parties with technical expertise. This helps to ensure a vision is achievable and considers the technical role of different stakeholders.

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2. Assess the ecosystem and stakeholders

Countries begin the process of adopting digital ID with different government and private entities already playing some role in establishing, verifying, and utilizing identity, digital or not. Depending on the level of economic and technological development a country starts with, citizens may already possess various digital and non-digital identities issued by public and private parties that they use for functional purposes, including banking, public records, online transactions, or social benefits. Which IDs already exist and their technical features are important to assess, as they may provide building blocks for a more comprehensive system, illuminate quicker paths to success, or indicate areas where stakeholders may resist changing current systems.

Countries are also embedded in local, regional, and global ecosystems of technology providers, implementers, and users who may be able to play a valuable role. Assessing the availability of capacity for building and implementing a digital ID system is important for informing technical and programmatic plans. Identifying gaps in local capacity that can be filled by international providers are also important for taking make or buy procurement decisions of different elements. If there are robust local players, seeking to identify local champions in the technology ecosystem can also yield an indispensable ally to help bring the private sector or other stakeholders along with changes.



Sweden: Building on a robust ecosystem

In contrast to many other countries, including many European peers, Sweden operates a federated system for digital identity with a very strong role for the private sector. As electronic services and the need for online authentication grew in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Sweden approached the issue in view of its long history of private sector-issued identification issued by institutions such as banks and post offices (Grönlund 2010). Instead of constructing a new system from scratch, it decided to recognize, promote, and coordinate the use of multiple private digital IDs checked against national population register personal identity numbers, all of which would be accepted by the government.

The most widespread digital ID in Sweden is the private BankID provided by an 11-bank consortium as well as one issued by telecom operator Telia. Leveraging a market-driven federated model has achieved a high but not universal penetration rate, with 91.9 percent of Swedish citizens holding a BankID by 2017, which was accepted by over 200 government agencies (OECD 2018). To achieve even higher rates, especially for marginal populations and migrants, the government is exploring an additional complementary public digital ID.

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